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24.03.17

Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel – 5th edition now available

3D Cover Spencer BowersmallSpencer Bower on Reliance-Based Estoppel, previously titled Estoppel by Representation, is the oldest leading textbook on the doctrines of reliance-based estoppel, by which a party is prevented from changing his position if he has induced another to rely on it such that the other will suffer by that change.

Radcliffe Chambers barristers Piers Feltham, Peter Crampin QC and Josh Winfield have co-written and revised this new edition, alongside Tom Leech QC of Herbert Smith Freehills and copies are now available to purchase directly from the link here. A discount is available to our clients which can be obtained by using the code BPESTOPPEL at the point of sale to qualify for 20% off the retail price.

Since the fourth edition in 2003 the House of Lords has decided two proprietary estoppel cases, Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Property Management Ltd and Thorner v Major, and developments in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel have required a complete revision of the related chapter, Chapter 12, in this edition. Thorner v Major confirms too the submission in the fourth edition that unequivocality is a requirement for any reliance-based estoppel founded on a representation, assurance or promise. Other submissions made in the fourth edition have also been upheld, such as the recognition that an estoppel may be founded on a representation of law (Briggs v Gleeds), that a party may preclude itself from denying a proposition by contract as well as another’s reliance (Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan Chase Bank) and that an estoppel by deed binds by agreement or declaration under seal rather than by reason of reliance (Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello).

With the adjustment reflected in the change of title, and distinguishing the foundation of estoppels that bind by deed and by contract, the editors adopt Spencer Bower’s unificatory project by the identification of the reliance-based estoppels as aspects of a single principle preventing a change of position that would be unfair by reason of responsibility for prejudicial reliance. From this follow the editors’ views on a number of issues identified in the foreword, such as that reliance-based estoppels have common requirements of responsibility, causation and prejudice, and estoppel by representation of fact is, like the other reliance-based estoppels, a rule of law. See more here.